Written by H. “Nate” Jarvis, L’26
Take a moment and think of what images spring to your mind when you hear the words “gang,” “gang member,” and “gang activity.” You may have specific markers that you use to identify individuals you come across in your daily life as potentially involved with a gang, like certain styles of clothing, tattoo content and placement, a person’s choice of color to wear, the neighborhood they live in, or even how late they stay out on the street. Like you, police agencies across the country look at these circumstantial markers, along with past convictions, informant identifications, and even simple proximity to another gang database roster member, to identify and predict who could be a current or future gang participant. However, unlike you, these police officers have the resources to both conduct sweeping research on their communities and to utilize that knowledge to escalate investigations and arrests. [1]
The results of this research by law enforcement organizations are stored in broad databases, and these databases inform countless investigations on members of the public across the country.[2] These databases go largely unreviewed and are unregulated by independent, non-law enforcement authorities.[3] Furthermore, inclusion in a gang database can result in intensified investigations, trial consequences, and social stigma regardless of the inclusion’s accuracy.[4]Accordingly, communities across the country should reevaluate the efficacy and necessity of these kinds of predictive policing tools, and our communities should revoke law enforcement agencies’ access to gang database rosters when the databases are misused against defendants and the general public.
Factors Fueling Gang Database Inclusion
Accordingly, our law enforcement apparatuses look to people’s clothing, body art, and more to track individuals they suspect to be involved in gang activity.[5] Intuitively, this might make sense to you. After all, law enforcement investigations certainly benefit from the ability to track someone’s past gang participation when considering the potential for that same individual’s further involvement in future gang activity; however, gang databases as blanket surveillance tools, while effective, function at the whims of each respective law enforcement agency’s discretion.[6] Thus, the opportunities for both individual and institutional prejudice and bias to warp the inclusionary processes in these databases are numerous.
Law enforcement agencies across the country widely utilize these factors when deciding whether to include an individual in their gang affiliation databases, and these databases can be shockingly large in terms of their data populations.[7] It is not surprising to learn that these databases are not perfect in terms of who is being identified and included as a gang affiliate, but the subsequent consequences of erroneous inclusion can indeed drastically alter an individual’s life for the worse.[8] Misidentified individuals might find themselves the subjects of intensified investigation by law enforcement in their communities, facing increased sentencing guidelines, and even facing potential deportation consequences as an indirect result of wearing a certain color out on a particular street too late at night.[9]
Flawed/Overinclusive Gang Database Use Across the Country
Law enforcement agencies appear to be unfamiliar with the realities faced by individuals in communities plagued by gang violence who live and coexist alongside neighbors, classmates, and loved ones who may have differing levels of exposure to organized crime. Many media outlets and production studios in the U.S. amplify instances of gang convictions as sensational and gripping television content, in addition to movies, video games, and television series that present fictional, dramatized representations of actual gangs in antagonist positions in their narratives.[10] While gang-sourced instances of violence and exploitation are certainly condemnable, the overamplification of these acts feeds the fear machine propagated by the media and law enforcement in tandem. Law enforcement offices’ overzealous efforts to include as many potential data points as possible in their gang databases are symptoms of the government’s efforts to “other” individuals by attaching them to the public panic around organized crime.[11]
A report from the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and other groups says most people are on a particular D.C. gang database only because “they were spotted associating with a gang member or seen at a gang meeting, and not because of any proven criminality or other criteria, such as displaying gang tattoos or being identified by an informant.”[12] The report goes on to say that “more than 400 D.C. police employees have access to the data, and at least 22 agencies outside the department have been given or received information from the list.”[13] These agencies range from immigration enforcement to juvenile policing, and their unfettered ability to access lists supposedly maintained to enable high-level gang investigations intensifies policing in so many areas of daily life, particularly for the marginalized groups that tend to overwhelmingly represent the populations in these databases.[14] In a shocking example of how these unregulated databases have run far afield of their stated purpose, this D.C. gang database is so overinclusive that its roster contains a one-year old infant supposedly identified as a member of a gang.[15]
Furthermore, the fundamental flaws in the institution of policing in the U.S. (including disproportionately negative outcomes for individuals of color in interactions with police) limit the efficacy of these supposed identifying factors for gang involvement.[16] In Portland, where Black people make up just 6% of the population, “64% of people included in the city’s gang database were Black, while members of white supremacist gangs were underrepresented.”[17] In Chicago, “95% of people who police identified as gang members during arrests were people of color.”[18] The New York City Chief of Detectives testified that “99% of the 17,200 people in the NYPD’s gang database in 2018 were people of color.”[19] Police are generally not required to inform people that they have been added to a database, and there is little transparency around how these databases are managed and used.[20] We do know, however, that innocent people are swept into these databases and wrongfully arrested because of their identification.[21]
In 2016, the NYPD arrested more than one hundred people in the Bronx on gang-related charges, but it later turned out that “dozens of [those arrested] were not in fact affiliated with gangs.”[22] Still, “115 of them entered guilty pleas — with only two people choosing to fight their charges at trial.”[23] The leverage presented to police by a suspect’s inclusion in a gang database allows law enforcement to coerce and extract confessions from defendants who may otherwise be innocent, and confessions are historically one of the single most persuasive pieces of evidence that a jury may see.[24] On the other side of the country in 2020, the Los Angeles Police Department’s flawed use of police-discretion gang databases resulted in six LAPD officers receiving charges surrounding falsified gang affiliation information, which allegedly “led to the individuals being added to the state’s gang database based on the falsified notes.”[25] After the exposure of that misconduct on the part of the police, the then-Attorney General of California took away the LAPD’s ability to access that gang database.[26] If more officials operated in an oversight capacity over these databases nation-wide, then instances of law enforcement misconduct would be identified earlier and the potential for harm would be better mitigated to members of the public targeted through these databases. Furthermore, if officials were more willing to follow California’s example and revoke law enforcement agencies’ access to so-called “predictive policing tools” like gang databases when those agencies err in their identification of members of the public as gang affiliates, then we may see a decreased frequency in incidents of wrongful conviction stemming from defendants’ erroneous inclusion in these unregulated gang database tools.
Remedies and Reforms
1.Proposal of New York Senate Bill S79
This bill would halt the use of biometric surveillance technologies until a regulatory task force is set up to approve existing and new biometric surveillance technologies, such as predictive policing tools and investigative systems such as gang databases.[27] The general public has an instinctive aversion to biometric surveillance systems, and this bill does well to tie those systems in with the observational impact of gang databases in policing.[28] Unfortunately, that legislature has trapped this bill in New York Senate committees for the last several years.[29] The stalled status of this bill proposal reflects a general legislative hesitation to enact safeguards and establish independent oversight for law enforcement offices’ gang databases.
2.Repeal of Northern Virginia Regional Gang Task Force D.C. Database
In 2021, the Northern Virginia Regional Gang Task Force abandoned a gang database (GangNet) shared by fifteen law enforcement agencies from multiple Virginia cities as well as the Virginia State Police.[30] GangNet used many of the common inclusion factors shared by organized crime databases across the country, such as snitch testimony, tattoo presence, clothing perceived to be gang attire, being seen in public with other people on a database roster, and prior convictions with co-defendants previously identified as gang affiliates.[31] GangNet lacked transparency measures, had no appeal process to dispute an individual’s addition to the database, and was utilized by regional jails and prisons to attach new inmates to gang identifications.[32] Furthermore, individuals who were added to the database had no notice of their inclusion despite the consequences to any subsequent investigations and trials.[33] While the Executive Director of one of the law enforcement agencies that maintained and operated the database (Office of National Drug Control Policy’s Washington/Baltimore High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas) claimed that the database’s demographics simply reflected the region’s gang demographics, civil rights advocates pointed to the fact that 80% of the databases profiles were on people of color as evidence of the databases built-in racial bias.[34]
SICO Tattoo, Innocent Fatcap Style Freehand Kult Tattoo Fest, Facebook (Mar. 10, 2023),
[1] See Do gang databases discriminate?, Am. Police Beat Mag. (Mar. 19, 2021)
https://apbweb.com/2021/03/do-gang-databases-discriminate/.
[2] See id.
[3] See Daniele Selby, How Racial Bias Contributes to Wrongful Conviction, Innocence Project
(Sep. 17, 2021),
https://innocenceproject.org/how-racial-bias-contributes-to-wrongful-conviction/.
[4] Peter Hermann, Gang Data Shows DC Police Have Been Targeting Black Residents,
Wash. Post (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2024/01/16/gang-data-police-dc/.
[5] Selby, supra note 3.
[6] Hermann, supra note 4.
[7] See id.
[8] See, e.g., Salvador Hernandez, San José to Pay Record Settlement of $12 Million to Man
Exonerated in 2002 Gang Shooting, LATimes (Jun. 18, 2024), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-06-18/san-jose-record-12-million-settlement-exoneration.
[9] See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 4.
[10] See, e.g., Boyz N the Hood (John Singleton dir., Columbia Pictures 1991).
[11] See, e.g. Democracy Docket Staff, Felony Disenfranchisement, Explained,
Democracy Docket.com, https://www.democracydocket.com/analysis/felony-disenfranchisement-explained/
[12] Hermann, supra note 4; Targeted, Labeled, Criticized: Early Findings on the District of
Columbia’s Gang Database, Wash. L. Comm. for C.R. and Urb. Affs., https://www.washlaw.org/mpd-gang-database (last visited Oct. 3, 2024).
[13] Hermann, supra note 4.
[14] See id.
[15] Wash. L. Comm. for C. R. and Urb. Affs., supra note 12.
[16] See Selby, supra note 3.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. (citing Center on Media, Crime & Justice at John Jay College).
[20] Id.
[21] Hermann, supra note 4.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] See Kassin, S. M., & Neumann, K., On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental
Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 Law and Human Behavior 469–484 (1997).
[25] APB Staff, supra note 1.
[26] Id.
[27] S.B. 79, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021); Selby, supra note 3.
[28] See S.B. 79, (N.Y. 2021).
[29] Id.
[30] APB Staff, supra note 1.
[31] Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
[34] Id.